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Abstract 
 
Health care fragmentation today raises costs and worsens health 
outcomes.  The theory of the firm indicates that cost and quality 
problems could be addressed by permitting greater vertical integration 
among complementary health care providers.  The puzzle is why such 
integration does not occur.  The answer is that a host of regulatory and 
payment laws create artificial obstacles to such integration.  Various 
provisions in Obamacare could and should be used to lift these obstacles 
and allow health care integration that could potentially save tens of 
thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars.  
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The fragmented nature of the U.S. healthcare system is quite anomalous.  A 
hilarious video on YouTube makes the point well, asking: what would it be like if 
air travel worked like healthcare?2  In this alternative world, we see an unfortunate 
consumer trying to book a cross-country flight to Oregon.  He discovers he needs 
to book separately with an East Coast specialist to get him to Chicago and a West 
Coast specialist to get him to Oregon, then book a separate baggage specialist and 
fuelist for each leg, all of whom bill separately and require their own paperwork, 
none of whom publicly post their rates, with the whole uncoordinated mess 
resulting in an astronomical cost to travel on a day different than when he wants to 
fly.  You cannot watch the video without thinking “thank heavens we do not live in 
that world.” 
 But for U.S. health care, we do live in that world.  Even the physicians who 
practice within a hospital are typically independent from each other and from the 
hospital and its nurses.  If you’re lucky, the hospital will have a case manager to 
try to coordinate all these actors, but the case manager will have a hard time 
getting the physicians to pay attention because the physicians are paid separately 
and the hospital depends on the admitting physician for business.  Outside of 
hospitals, the situation is even worse. The average Medicare patient sees 7 doctors 
a year, 10 if the patient has a chronic condition, and no one is paid to coordinate 
them.   
 The evidence indicates, as I show in Part I, that this fragmentation raises 
costs and worsens health outcomes.  Further, as Part II explains, the economic 
theory of the firm suggests that allowing competing providers to provide greater 
                                                 
2 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5J67xJKpB6c  
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levels of integration should improve these results.  The problem, Part III 
demonstrates, is that current law stands in the way.  Regulatory laws restrict how 
hospitals and physicians can work together, while payment laws generally require 
disaggregated payments, other than limited exceptions like HMOs that permit only 
a specific form of integration with its own downsides.  Together, this legal 
framework today prevents health care markets from reaching the optimal level of 
health care integration, instead favoring fragmentation of health care provision and 
payment.3 
 The good news is that Obamacare might well provide the solution to this 
problem.4  Although public attention has focused on other controversial aspects,5 
Obamacare also contains a number of provisions that could, Part IV shows, lift 
current legal obstacles to efficient healthcare integration.  All we need is 
appropriate implementing regulations to accomplish this market deregulation.  This 
approach is probably the least painful way to lower health care costs because it 
actually increases quality.  It should also have bipartisan appeal because it would 
use provisions of Obamacare to adopt the sort of de-regulatory reforms that 
generally appeal to Republicans, but should also appeal to Democrats because they 
will likely be necessary to make Obamacare a success.  Best of all, it can be done 
through executive action, thus sparing us the agony of trying to pass another 
healthcare statute. 
                                                 
3 For a comprehensive set of essays that address causes, effects, and remedies for 
fragmentation in the U.S. health care system, see generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. 
HEALTHCARE (Einer R. Elhauge ed., 2010). 
4 By Obamacare I mean the statute formally known as the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
and 42 U.S.C.).  Although the term Obamacare was originally a mocking Republican 
characterization designed for political effect, even President Obama now embraces it on the 
grounds that saying that Obama cares is not exactly an insult.  I thus use the term because it is 
certainly shorter and more memorable, and I think it has lost the partisan spin it once had. 
5 See ELHAUGE, OBAMACARE ON TRIAL (2012). 
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I. How Fragmentation Raises Costs and Hurts Patients 
 Fragmentation Within Hospitals.  Fragmentation at the level of a single 
illness can occur when there is a failure to coordinate among the various providers 
with whom a patient interacts during a single hospital visit. 6  Attending physicians 
within a hospital are typically independent of each other and of the hospital.  
Further, hospital administrators have no direct control over physician decisions.  
Nor do they have much financial leverage because attending physicians typically 
bill separately.  Indeed, the financial incentives tend to run the other way because 
physicians are usually the primary source of the hospital’s business.  While a 
dedicated case manager (when provided by a hospital) can help prevent some 
failures of communication, case management does not give the hospital actual 
control, nor does it change the financial incentives of either the doctors or the 
hospital.  
To illustrate how fragmentation can impair healthcare even within a world 
leading hospital, consider a recent article’s account of the organization of surgical 
instruments at Stanford University Hospital.7  Surgeons at the hospital, each of 
whom was an independent contractor who received a fee for each surgery, 
indicated the instruments they required by submitting preference cards.  
Technicians, who are hospital employees, were responsible for loading the 
requested supplies onto a cart to follow the varying physician specifications.  
Under this system, errors could occur in filling out the cards, loading the supplies, 
mislabeling bins, or a host of other possibilities.  Physicians had no direct contact 
with these technicians, so tended to blame the nurses when errors occurred even 
though the nurses had nothing to do with loading the instruments.  These failures 
                                                 
6 See Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation and How to 
Fix It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTHCARE, supra note 3, at 1, 1–6. 
7 See Randal Cebul et al., Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. 
Health Care System, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTHCARE, supra note 3, 37, at 47–48. 
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led to potentially unsafe practices, such as nurses keeping instruments in lockers, 
doctors taking instruments home with them, and flash sterilizations of instruments 
rather than the preferred six-hour sterilization process. 
Neither this situation, nor this article’s assessment of the problem, is 
idiosyncratic.  They are perfectly in line with reports by the Institute of Medicine, 
the highly-influential medical branch of the National Academy of Sciences that 
offers independent evidence-based advice on health policy.  The Institute has 
concluded that similar problems exist throughout the system because of a 
fragmented system that focuses on “professional prerogatives and separate roles” 
rather than on “cooperation and teamwork.”8 As a result, “Patients and families 
commonly report that caregivers appear not to coordinate their work, or even to 
know what others are doing. Suboptimization is seen, for example, in operating 
rooms that must maintain multiple different surgical tray setups for different 
doctors performing the same procedure. Each doctor gets what he or she wants, but 
at the cost of introducing enormous complexity and possible error into the 
system.”9  
All this would be less worrisome if medical errors within hospitals were not 
a serious problem, but they are.  According to the Institute of Medicine, 
preventable medical errors in hospitals result annually in 44,000 to 98,000 deaths 
and cost between $17 and $29 billion.10  The Institute concludes that: “The 
decentralized and fragmented nature of the health care delivery system ... 
                                                 
8 COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY 
CHASM 83 (2001) [hereinafter “IOM, Chasm”.] 
9 Id. 
10 COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN 1–2 
(2001). The Institute of Medicine estimates that health care costs represent approximately half of 
the $17–29 billion cost; the other half represents lost income and production. Id. 
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contributes to unsafe conditions for patients, and serves as an impediment to efforts 
to improve safety.”11   
In short, medical errors in hospitals annually cause tens of thousands of 
deaths and billions of dollars in costs, and health care fragmentation causes many 
of these medical errors.  The Institute adds:  
A highly fragmented delivery system that largely lacks even 
rudimentary clinical information capabilities results in poorly 
designed care processes characterized by unnecessary duplication of 
services and long waiting times and delays. And there is substantial 
evidence documenting overuse of many services—services for which 
the potential risk of harm outweighs the potential benefits....  
[P]atients tell stories of fragmented care in which relevant information 
is lost, overlooked, or ignored; of wasted resources; of frustrated 
efforts to obtain timely access to services; and of lost opportunities. 
When clinicians and their families and those steeped in health 
management become patients, they, too, find that there appears to be 
no one who can make the systems function safely and effectively.”12 
 
Fragmentation Across Providers.  Fragmentation in the care provided to a 
single patient can also occur when there is a failure to coordinate between different 
providers treating different conditions or even different aspects of the same 
condition.  The typical Medicare beneficiary sees two primary-care and five 
specialist physicians a year; those with a chronic disease such as coronary artery 
disease see on average ten physicians annually.13 Worse, as Professor David 
Hyman notes, each physician is “focused on the discrete symptoms and/or body 
parts within their jurisdiction.”14  Medical histories from other providers are often 
                                                 
11 Id. at 3. 
12 IOM, CHASM, supra note 8, at 3, 43. 
13 Hoangmai Phan et al., Care Patterns in Medicare and Their Implications for Pay for 
Performance, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1130, 1134 tbl.1 (2007). 
14 David A. Hyman, Health Care Fragmentation: We Get What We Pay for, in THE 
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, 21, at 23. 
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unavailable or distrusted, leading to imaging studies or laboratory tests being 
unnecessarily repeated.15    
Payment structures contribute to this disjointedness.  Neither Medicare nor 
other insurers pay physicians to coordinate care.16  To the contrary, because 
providers are paid separately for the amount of care they provide, coordination that 
solves medical problems more effectively would reduce the need for provider 
services and thus reduce their revenue.17  The perverse result can be that “providers 
can actually do better if their patients do worse.”18 
These conclusions again comport with the assessment of the renowned 
Institute of Medicine, which concludes that “physician groups, hospitals, and other 
health care organizations operate as silos, often providing care without the benefit 
of complete information about the patient’s condition, medical history, services 
provided in other settings, or medications prescribed by other clinicians.”19  More 
generally, the Institute states: “Today’s health care system is not well designed to 
meet the needs of patients with common chronic conditions. ...  For too many ... 
care for even a single condition is fragmented across many clinicians and settings 
with little coordination or communication, and some needs remain undetected 
and/or unmet.” 20 
 One striking empirical study directly addressed whether having more 
physicians treat a patient worsens care.  It studied the outcome differences for 
Medicare patients after a heart attack depending on whether they were in a region 
that used a relatively low number of 4.8 physicians per patient or a region that used 
                                                 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 26. 
17 Id. at 26-27. 
18 Id. at 27. 
19 IOM, CHASM, supra note 8, at 4. 
20 IOM, CHASM, supra note 8, at 90. 
7 
 
a relatively high number of 9.2 physicians per patient.21  It found that regions that 
used more physicians per patient increased patient costs by $3,331 (with a 99.9% 
statistical level of confidence), which was 10% of the average expenditure of 
around $33,000.22  It also found that regions that used more physicians per patient 
increased patient deaths within a year by 2.5 per 100 patients (with a 94% 
statistical level of confidence), which was 8% of the average rate of 32.23  So 
seeing more physicians not only increased costs by 10%, but (contrary to common 
intuition) worsens medical outcomes, here increasing the odds of death by 8%. 
 This sort of fragmentation also helps explain why, for a nation that spends so 
much money on health care, our overall metrics are so unimpressive.  Of course, it 
is well known that measures of U.S. health are worse than developed nations that 
spend much less on health care.  But because those sorts of statistics are subject to 
the objection that this difference may reflect our diet or lifestyle, consider a 
simpler metric: what percentage of us get medically recommended levels of 
preventive care or, when we have a chronic illness, receive the recommended 
treatments for it?  It turns out that the answers are only 55% on the first question 
and only 56% on the second.24  That is remarkably low, and it seems likely that 
part of the explanation is that ensuring that recommended care is provided often 
falls through the cracks in our fragmented system where lines of responsibility are 
unclear. 
 U.S. healthcare fragmentation also produces outsized administrative costs.  
As of 1999, health care administration cost $1059 per person in the United States, 
                                                 
21 Jonathan S. Skinner, Douglas O. Staiger, and Elliott S. Fisher, Is Technological Change in 
Medicine Always Worth It?  The Case of Acute Myocardial Infarction, 25 Health Affairs W34, 
W42-43 (2006). 
22 Id. at W40, W42-43. 
23 Id. at W39, W42-43. 
24 Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United 
States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2641, 2642 tbl.3 (2003). 
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which was not only a remarkable 31% of total U.S. health care costs, but also more 
than triple the $307 per person administrative cost in Canada.25  Part of this reflects 
the fact that US health insurers are far more fragmented than Canada’s nationalized 
health insurance system, with insurance overhead costing $259 per person in the 
United States versus $47 per person in Canada.26  But much of the difference 
reflects the sort of fragmentation in healthcare provision at issue in this article.  For 
hospitals, administrative costs per person were $315 in the United States versus 
$103 in Canada.  For practitioners, administrative costs per person were $324 in 
the United States versus $107 in Canada.27  In short, the average administrative 
costs per U.S. patient, hospital, and doctor are each triple those of their Canadian 
counterparts. 
 
II. The Theory of the Firm 
Although our health care system clearly seems excessively fragmented, that 
does not mean all integration is good.  Well-functioning markets always feature 
some mixture of integration and disintegration.  After all, buying airplane tickets 
may allow travelers to avoid choosing and coordinating pilots, planes, flight 
attendants, ticket agents, baggage handlers, and mechanics, but airlines do not also 
provide our taxicab to the airport or our hotel when we arrive. 
Moreover, the optimal level of integration often changes over time with 
changing technologies or economics.  At one time, people bought cars without 
wipers or bumpers and selected those separately.28  Airlines themselves now often 
charge separately for food, leading many passengers to buy their food before 
                                                 
25 Steffie Woolhandler et al., Costs of Health Care Administration in the United States and 
Canada, 349 New Eng. J. Med. 768, 772 (2003). 
26 Id. at 771 tbl.1. 
27 Id. at 771 tbl.1. 
28 ELHAUGE, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 369 (2d. Ed. Foundation Press 2011). 
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boarding from other firms, thus suggesting that air travel is becoming 
disaggregated from airplane food.  Of course, airplane food is so bad that it became 
a comedic cliche, but other airline services also might become disaggregated.  For 
example, airlines now frequently charge for baggage, and some separate firms are 
beginning to offer the service of taking your baggage directly from your home to 
your destination.  While the latter service currently seems priced more at luxury 
levels, one could easily imagine the economics changing so that the transport of 
humans and their baggage became efficiently disintegrated in the future. 
Indeed, even now, some beneficial changes in health care organization may 
involve disintegration.  For example, retail health clinics have separated some 
routine healthcare from other healthcare.  But getting this routine care while 
shopping could be beneficial, especially if the lower costs, greater convenience, 
and decreased delay results in patients getting medically beneficial healthcare more 
regularly and on time.29 
The economic “theory of the firm” explains how markets efficiently 
determine what activities to integrate into firms rather than leave outside them.  As 
Professor Ronald Coase first pointed out, a defining characteristic of business 
firms is that they use centralized control, rather than internal markets, to allocate 
and coordinate resources.30  They will find this profitable only when centralized 
control provides an efficiency advantage over decentralized market transactions.  
Professors Alchain and Demsetz then showed that the major efficiency advantage 
firms have is that centralized control can mitigate the incentives to shirk that 
characterize a market system when it is hard for the market to measure and reward 
                                                 
29 See Elhauge, supra note 6, at 2; Hyman, supra note 14, at 34. 
30 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937). 
10 
 
each individual’s contribution to team production that requires joint effort.31  Firms 
solve these inefficiencies by having a single owner that can both “(1) select, direct, 
monitor, and reward or punish team members based on their contributions to the 
joint product and (2) has a residual claim to any profits on the sale of the joint 
product that are left after all the team members are paid.”32 A residual claim to 
profits, coupled with the ability to monitor and control the inputs, is important in 
giving the owner both the ability and incentives to coordinate most efficiently — 
minimizing shirking by individual team members and ensuring that the joint 
product is maximally profitable.  
Team production may not have been as important in healthcare decades ago, 
but has become vital to modern healthcare.  Physicians, hospitals, nurses, drugs, 
devices, tests, technicians, and other inputs must be combined to produce the joint 
result of healthy outcomes.  Yet it is difficult to determine the contribution of each 
participant to the joint result without close observation. 
In health care, “shirking” generally does not take the form of failing to work 
– people in health care tend to work remarkably hard.  Instead, shirking usually 
consists of failing to coordinate with other providers who also affect the same 
patients’ health on strategy, timing, and information in a way that maximizes 
health benefits and minimize costs.  Thus, where providers might be able to “shirk” 
in this way, greater coordination would be beneficial.  However, the “right” level 
of coordination will vary across different areas of health care, depending on where 
direct observation and shirking are more or less likely, and will likely change with 
changing technology. 
                                                 
31 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
32 Elhauge, supra note 6, at 6. 
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Unfortunately, U.S. health care generally refuses to adopt centralized 
ownership structures to deal with this team production problem.  (For now put 
aside the HMO exception, which is constrained in ways that create other 
downsides discussed below.)  A single hospital stay requires treatment by multiple 
physicians, each of whom is typically independent of the others and the hospital.  
The hospital thus cannot direct or monitor the medical decisions of the physicians 
and, because the hospital does not pay the physicians, cannot leverage payments to 
influence physicians.  In any case, the hospital has insufficient incentive to 
coordinate because it is not a residual claimant that stands to gain profit by 
coordinating physicians.  The medical staff, which can review the decisions of 
physicians, similarly lacks the incentive that a residual claimant would have to 
control physician decisionmaking.  Beyond a single hospital stay, the problems 
multiply: each physician bills for her own services and no one receives payment to 
coordinate among the providers.  The most obvious choices to coordinate care, 
either the primary-care physician or the insurer, are not residual claimants and have 
little incentive to serve in such a coordinating function.  In any case, both the 
primary-care physician and the insurer lack the power to direct the decisions of 
other providers, even if doing so would lower costs and improve care. 
True, medical providers sometimes coordinate in heroic ways to ameliorate 
this problem.  But even then the system fails because the payment system rewards 
each participant for the amount of care they provide.  The system does not pay a 
residual claimant for the value of the care, which would create the normal firm 
profit incentive to increase value and minimize the costs of providing that value.  
For example, Duke University Hospital once adopted an integrated program to 
treat congestive heart failure.  The program reduced costs by approximately 40% 
by improving outcomes and lowering hospital admissions.  But while the program 
was a resounding medical success, it was a business failure.  By reducing the 
12 
 
health problems it could bill to treat, Duke actually lost money.33  It is admirable 
how often we see medical institutions attempt these sorts of herculean efforts to 
coordinate in ways that improve medical outcomes, but we are unlikely to see 
widespread adoption of such efforts if our payment system continues to penalize 
them financially. 
 
III. How Current Law Mandates Fragmentation 
 So we have strong evidence that fragmentation worsens medical outcomes 
and costs, as well as sound economic theory that greater integration could alleviate 
those problems.  Why, then, have we not seen healthcare institutions actually 
integrate in way that solve these fragmentation problems? 
 After all, calls to address healthcare fragmentation are not new, and efforts 
to institute organizational change have been made.  They have just not been 
successful.  The Institute of Medicine observes: 
What is perhaps most disturbing is the absence of real progress toward 
restructuring health care systems to address both quality and cost 
concerns, or toward applying advances in information technology to 
improve administrative and clinical processes....  Mergers, 
acquisitions, and affiliations have been commonplace within the 
health plan, hospital, and physician practice sectors. Yet all this 
organizational turmoil has resulted in little change in the way health 
care is delivered.34  
 
 Why has organizational consolidation produced so little improvement?  Part 
of the problem is that organizations adopt the permissible forms of integration that 
are the most profitable, and our payment system rewards fragmentation rather than 
medical efficiency.  As the Institute put it: 
                                                 
33 This example is laid out in Regina E. Herzlinger, Why Innovation in Health Care is So 
Hard, 84 HARV. BUS. REV. 58, 64 (2006). 
34 IOM, CHASM, supra note 8, at 3. 
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The current payment system often reinforces fragmentation by paying 
separately according to the setting of care and provider type, and by 
not giving providers the flexibility needed to customize care for 
individual patients....   Furthermore, the fragmentation of payment by 
service can make it difficult for care to be coordinated efficiently 
across multiple settings.  There is a misalignment among what the 
patient needs, the services provided, and how needed services are paid 
for.35 
 
The Institute thus recommends that “purchasers and health plans,... should 
eliminate or modify payment practices that fragment the care system.”36  But that 
shifts the question to a new level: why haven’t institutions changed payment 
practices to encourage more efficient medical organization? 
 The answer is simple.  Current law gets in the way of private efforts to 
reform both organization and payment structure.  This has stymied adoption of the 
Institute’s recommendations on both fronts. 
 On organization, the law inhibits the development of firms that control the 
provision of care and have the profit motive of a residual claimant. The law does 
so through various legal obstacles to prevent corporations from controlling 
physicians or charging for medical services.   
 To begin with, the “corporate practice of medicine” doctrine provides that 
firms cannot direct how physicians practice medicine because firms cannot hold 
medical licenses, only the physicians can.37  This doctrine is often mistakenly 
thought to be a dead letter because so many states have created exceptions 
allowing hospitals to employ physicians.  However, the employment exception is 
neither as widespread nor as relevant as commonly thought.  On how widespread it 
is, a recent fifty state survey reveals that only 25 states have such an exception, and 
                                                 
35 Id. at 101, 202. 
36 Id. at 13. 
37 See Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health 
Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 509–18 (1988).    
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15 states do not.38  The other 10 have no explicit law on the corporate practice of 
medicine, but are likely to follow the dominant law that bans it and prohibits such 
employment absent a statutory exception.  Further, the 15 states that clearly do 
prohibit the employing of physicians without any hospital exception include many 
of our most populated states, like California, Texas, New York, Florida, Georgia 
and Massachusetts, and comprise a little more than 50% of the US population.39   
 More important, the hospital employment exception simply allows the 
formal employment of physicians.   It does not alter the corporate practice of 
medicine doctrine that prevents firms from directing their physician-employees 
because such direction is itself deemed the unauthorized practice of medicine.40  
Indeed, of the 25 states to adopt a hospital employment exception, 14 explicitly 
provide that hospitals cannot even influence the medical judgments of their 
physician-employees, and the other 11 implicitly probably mean the same.41  This 
employment exception thus does not permit the sort of corporate control required 
by the theory of the firm.  It is like permitting airlines to employ pilots as long as 
they do not tell them where, when, or how to fly.42 
 Tort law provides a further disincentive by often imposing liability on firms 
that interfere with the medical judgments of physicians.43  Accreditation standards 
and sometimes licensing laws mandate that hospitals adopt bylaws that leave the 
                                                 
38 See Mary H. Michal et al., Ctr. to Advance Palliative Care, Corporate Practice of 
Medicine Doctrine: 50 State Survey Summary (2006).  Federal law also creates an exception for 
HMOs, but this does not apply to other forms of integration.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10a (1982). 
39 US Census Bureau, 2012 Statistical Abstract, available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/rankings.html. 
40 Elhauge, supra note 6, at 12. 
41 Michal, supra note 38. 
42 Further, of the 25 states that have an employment exception, 9 limit it to hospitals, and 
thus do not permit other forms of integration, 2 limit it to nonprofits, and 1 limits to either 
hospitals or nonprofits. Id.  So only 13 states allow employment by any corporation that refrains 
from interfering with physician decisions. 
43 Elhauge, supra note 6, at 12. 
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medical staff be in charge of medical decisions.44  Medicare also reinforces 
physician autonomy by requiring physicians to certify the medical need for the 
services that they render,45 and by prohibiting federal officials from supervising the 
practice of medicine or selecting some providers over others.46 
 On payment structure, the law requires a separation of payments that 
effectively prohibit integrated payments to firms that can serve as a residual 
claimant that would orchestrate all the providers necessary to jointly produce some 
health outcome.  (HMOs enjoy a special exception from these rules, but have other 
downsides that I take up below.)  The law does so by generally requiring separate 
payments for hospitalization, physician services, drugs, and outpatient services that 
must go directly to each provider.  Medicare explicitly separates payments for 
hospitals (Part A) from those for physicians (Part B) and those for pharmaceuticals 
(Part D).47  True, within the hospital category, Medicare and other insurers have for 
decades allowed bundled payments for all hospital services used to treat a given 
disease related group (DRG).  But those DRG payments remain separate from 
payments to physicians and for pharmaceuticals, which remain focused only on 
services performed, and often Medicare pays different amounts for the same thing, 
depending on who performed the service.48  Medicare thus bars a firm from 
charging for everything necessary to treat a specific illness.  Medicare further does 
not reimburse for the coordination of care or case management.49  Because 
Medicare is the biggest source of hospital revenue, typically providing 35-55% of 
the money hospitals receive, hospitals cannot afford to organize themselves in a 
                                                 
44 Elhauge, supra note 6, at 12. 
45 42 U.S.C. § 1395n (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Elhauge, supra note 6, at 11. 
46 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006); Elhauge, supra note 6, at 11. 
47 Elhauge, supra note 6, at 11.  These names for the various Medicare programs come from 
the codification of Medicare in 42 U.S.C., chapter 7, subchapter XVIII. 
48 See Hyman, supra note 14, at 26. 
49 Elhauge, supra note 6, at 11. 
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way that does not comply with Medicare.  And because hospital care is generally 
an important part of integrated care, other organizations cannot afford to do so 
either.   
 Even if they wanted to do so, separate payments are generally required by 
statutes that prohibit splitting fees to either induce treatment (referral fees) or deter 
treatment (anti-referral fees).50  The federal anti-kick statute law makes it a crime 
to pay fees to induce referrals for federally reimbursable medical services, and the 
Stark law prohibits physicians from referring any Medicare or Medicaid patients to 
an entity with whom it has a financial relationship.51  These federal laws have 
exceptions for HMOs and employment relationships, but the latter apply only if the 
physician compensation is solely for the value of their services and does not take 
into account the physician decision’s effect on referrals.52  Federal law also 
imposes civil money penalties on anyone who makes payments to a reduce 
referrals for federally reimbursable medical services.53  Further, many states 
directly criminalize referral fees and/or specify that referral fees are grounds for the 
suspension or revocation of a physician’s license.54  Such bans on fee-splitting 
effectively prevent firms from using incentives or control to affect physician 
decisions about what medical services to provide. 
 Thus, although health care has seen many mergers and organizational 
changes, these laws have constrained vertical mergers, which are consolidations 
that integrate complementary inputs into team production in a way that produces 
the kind of efficient integration we see in industries like airlines.  Instead, the 
                                                 
50 Hall, supra note 37, at 488. 
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b); id. § 1395nn(a).   
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(F); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(i)&(t); 42 U.S.C. § 
1395nn(b)&(e).   
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b). 
54 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 650–652; FLA. STAT. § 395.0185 (2011); id. § 
458.331(1)(i). 
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mergers we have seen in health care have tended to involve horizontal 
consolidations of competing services, because combining hospitals or physician 
practices does not violate the fragmented role divisions required by these laws.  To 
be sure, antitrust scrutiny remains available to check horizontal mergers, but the 
enforcement agencies have generally lost cases challenging hospital mergers, in 
part because of the intuition that some integration would be helpful.  The perverse 
upshot is that in health care our combination of laws have posed a much greater 
barrier to vertical integration that could efficiently reduce fragmentation than to 
horizontal mergers that increase market power in a way that worsens efficiency.  
This is precisely the opposite of what prevails in other industries, where antitrust is 
generally the operative constraint and imposes much tighter limits on horizontal 
mergers than on vertical integration. 
  Together, these regulatory and payment laws limit organizational and 
payment innovation to protect a form of individual physician autonomy that once 
made a great deal of sense, when medical care was largely provided by a single 
physician to his patient with minimal equipment.  But doing so makes little sense 
in the modern world where many medical treatments require intricate teamwork 
and expensive equipment. 
 As noted above, the law creates an exception permitting integration into an 
HMO, and proponents of HMOs argue (I think convincingly) that these HMOs 
generally function better than traditional fragmented medicine.55  But this 
exception dictates a very specific form of integration, rather than allowing firms to 
pick whatever level of integration is most efficient to achieve a valuable result.  
Moreover, while this legally approved form of integration has many benefits, it 
also has downsides that make it less than fully optimal. 
                                                 
55 Enthoven, Curing Fragmentation with Integrated Delivery Systems, in THE 
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTHCARE, supra note 3, at 61-86. 
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In particular, HMOs are not paid for the value of the care they provide, or 
for treating a specific illness, but rather receive a fixed annual fee per insured.  
This means that an HMO is not a residual claimant that receives payment for 
achieving a particular valued result, which would give it incentives to pay team 
members to achieve that result with maximum efficiency.  Instead, an HMO’s 
profits are the difference between their flat annual fees and the cost of the care they 
provide, which provides an incentive to under-care, even if that worsens health 
outcomes.56  Moreover, the annual form of payment also means that HMOs 
integrate all medical services to treat enrollees each year, whether or not that is 
actually the efficient level of integration given varying technology and geography.  
Further, in part to offset their incentive to under-care, HMOs are subject to laws 
that restrict their ability to control their physicians.  Such legal restrictions mean 
HMOs lack the power to achieve the full benefits of corporate control required by 
the theory of the firm.  Moreover, any legal restrictions are inevitably imperfect at 
correcting for incentives to undercare. 
To be sure, the best controlled study shows that HMOs offer the same 
overall health outcomes as traditional fee-for-service medicine at a lower cost.57  
But this study does not establish that their incentive to undercare fails to influence 
HMOs.  To the contrary, it shows that (reflecting this incentive) HMOs do provide 
less beneficial care than their fee-for-service counterparts.58  However, it also 
shows that HMOs provide less harmful care than fee-for-service medicine (which 
has an incentive to overcare) and that the two effects cancel each other out in 
overall health outcomes.59  This combination may well make HMOs overall 
                                                 
56 See Elhauge, supra note 6, at 9. 
57 JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE 
EXPERIMENt (1993). 
58 Id. at 283. 
59 Id. 
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superior to traditional fee-for-service medicine, but it also means we are far from 
the optimum, which would be to eliminate the harmful care but still provide all 
care whose benefits exceed its costs.  These constraints have also limited the 
market appeal of HMOs in a way that helps explain why, notwithstanding their 
proponent’s arguments for their superiority, HMOs have not in fact swept health 
care markets.   
In short, while the HMO exception is probably an improvement on 
fragmented fee-for-service medicine, HMOs combine flawed incentives with 
imperfect control in a way that is far from optimal and fails to track the incentive 
and control structure required by the theory of the firm.  To think of HMOs as a 
solution to the fragmentation problem is analogous to “solving” the need for 
integration in the air travel industry with a law that permits the integration of 
personnel and equipment into airlines only if the airline sells an annual pass to 
cover each consumer’s reasonable air travel needs for the year and avoids 
influencing the aviation judgments of their employees.  Perhaps the specific 
integration allowed by HMOs is attractive in some situations, but there is little 
reason to think it is always the optimal form of integration.   
 We should not limit health care markets to the poles of fragmented fee-for-
service medicine or the specific forms of integration dictated by limited legal 
exceptions (like those for HMOs) to the laws that otherwise require fragmentation.  
Instead, the law should be neutral as to the appropriate level of integration, without 
restricting forms of integration that may be efficient.  This neutral approach would 
allow market forces to determine optimal levels of integration (much as the market 
does for air travel), focusing instead on fashioning payment and liability systems to 
give competing firms incentives to choose whatever method optimizes team 
production by medical professionals.  Only in this way can the law encourage 
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those in the market to innovate in a way that develops efficient systems that 
balance high-quality delivery with low-cost provision.  
 
IV. How Obamacare Can Help 
 Can Obamacare help address the fragmentation problem?  The answer, 
perhaps surprising to those who have focused on controversial issues like the 
insurance mandate, is yes.  Obamacare contains a number of other provisions that 
create important regulatory authority to address fragmentation in health care.  
 For policy insiders, the most well-known of these are the provisions that 
allow for the creation of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), which can 
coordinate care and, if they meet quality performance standards, receive a share of 
savings that they can in turn distribute among providers.  These provisions allow 
groups of physicians and hospitals with “shared governance”60 to participate as 
ACOs.  Such groups must “be willing to become accountable for the quality, cost, 
and overall care” of the patients that join the ACO.61  Further requirements specify, 
among other things, that ACOs must join the program for at least three years, must 
have a minimum size in terms of patients assigned to the ACO, and must meet 
quality and reporting thresholds.62  Obamacare then provides for a “shared savings 
program.”63  Should the ACO’s average per capita costs (including hospital and 
physician payments under Medicare Parts A and B) fall below a benchmark set by 
regulation, the ACO will be eligible to receive payments that equal a share of those 
savings, which they can distribute among the providers belonging to the ACO.64  
                                                 
60 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(1). 
61 Id. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(A). 
62 Id. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(B); id. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(D); id. § 1395jjj(b)(3). 
63 Id. § 1395jjj(a)(1). 
64 Id. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(B)(i). 
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Eligibility also depends on meeting quality benchmarks and not taking affirmative 
steps to avoid higher-risk patients.65 
 Unfortunately, the regulations implementing the ACO provisions so far 
continue to separate Medicare payments for care to each hospital and provider.66  
For reasons discussed above, such separate payments provide an incentive for 
hospitals and physicians to increase care.  This incentive to over-care (and receive 
the full price for any services provided) can easily override the counter-incentive 
created by shared savings payments, which give ACOs only a fraction of the 
savings from cutting this care that they then have to split among the participating 
hospitals and physicians. 
 To be sure, we are not limited to these initial implementing regulations.  The 
statutory provisions allow the future adoption of regulations that could change the 
separate payment model itself in a way that eliminates this obstacle to efficient 
integration.67  But it seems less likely that the ACO provisions would allow 
regulations that remove legal obstacles to firm control over physicians.  Thus, the 
ACO provisions are unlikely to provide a complete solution to the fragmentation 
problem.  Still, one has to walk before one can run, and the creation of ACOs 
seems likely to be an important first step in the evolution toward less fragmentation 
of health care.  The ACOs will not be fully integrated firms like airlines, but will 
link providers in ways that could more easily morph into such integrated firms in 
the future. 
 In any event, although the ACO provisions have received the most attention 
from policy insiders, other provisions offer the promise of a more complete 
solution to our fragmentation problem.  In particular, consider the provisions on 
                                                 
65 Id. § 1395jjj(d)(3)–(4). 
66 Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 
72 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).  
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(i). 
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the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMI) and the Independent 
Payment Advisory Board (IPAB). 
 The CMI provides a way to test new health care payment and delivery 
systems, including those that decrease fragmentation.  Introducing the idea, the 
provisions state: 
The purpose of the CMI is to test innovative payment and service 
delivery models to reduce program expenditures . . . while preserving 
or enhancing the quality of care furnished to individuals . . . . In 
selecting such models, the Secretary shall give preference to models 
that also improve the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health 
care services . . . .68 
The statute then sets out both criteria to guide the selection of models to be tested, 
as well as particular payment and delivery models that might merit examination.  
Models tested should be those that “address[] a defined population for which there 
are deficits in care leading to poor clinical outcomes or potentially avoidable 
expenditures.”69  This language certainly encompasses models that address 
fragmentation, given the abundant evidence that the lack of coordination reduces 
quality and increases cost.70   
 Further, several of the specific models mentioned in the CMI provisions 
address concerns that lead to fragmentation.  One potential model that can be 
tested is: “Contracting directly with groups of providers of services and suppliers 
to promote innovative care delivery models, such as through risk-based 
comprehensive payment or salary-based payment.”71  Another model would be: 
“Establishing comprehensive payments to Healthcare Innovation Zones, consisting 
of groups of providers that include a teaching hospital, physicians, and other 
                                                 
68 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
69 Id. § 1315a(b)(2)(A). 
70 See Part I, supra. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). 
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clinical entities, that, through their structure, operations, and joint activity deliver 
a full spectrum of integrated and comprehensive health care services.”72  These 
provisions would allow CMI to adopt regulations that override the legal obstacles 
to integrated payments and control that cause undue fragmentation.  
 The CMI provisions tend to be overlooked because they seem to provide 
merely for experimentation, rather than authorize national regulation.  But the 
provisions actually allow CMI to extend any successful experiment on a national 
basis and thus make it national policy.  The statute provides that: 
[T]he Secretary may, through rulemaking, expand (including 
implementation on a nationwide basis) the duration and the scope of a 
model that is being tested ... if ... the Secretary determines that such 
expansion is expected to-- (A) reduce spending under applicable title 
without reducing the quality of care; or (B) improve the quality of 
care and reduce spending.”73 
 
 The IPAB provisions create a new independent agency, the Independent 
Payment Advisory Board, that is required to produce proposals to lower Medicare 
spending in years where payments are expected to exceed targets.74  An interesting 
feature of IPAB is that it can make proposals that become law unless Congress 
enacts legislation to override the specific proposal.75  In meeting its duty to reduce 
Medicare costs, IPAB cannot ration care, increase premiums or cost-sharing, or 
restrict benefits or eligibility.76 
 What distinguishes IPAB from CMI is that the IPAB must act should the 
statutory triggers be met: “The [IPAB] shall develop detailed and specific 
                                                 
72 Id. § 1315a(b)(2)(B)(xviii) (emphasis added). 
73 Id. § 1315a(c) (emphasis added). 
74 Id. § 1395kkk(b).  See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Independent Medicare 
Advisory Board, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 21 (2011). 
75 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(b)(3).  The ACA also contains expedited procedures for Congress to 
consider proposals by the IPAB. See id. § 1395kkk(d). 
76 Id. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii); see also id. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(iii) (prohibiting IPAB 
proposals before 2020 that would lower provider reimbursements). 
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proposals related to the Medicare program . . . .”77  Moreover, IPAB not only can, 
but must, make proposals that improve health or efficiency through greater 
integration or coordination if it can.  “In developing and submitting each proposal . 
. . , the [IPAB] shall, to the extent feasible . . . include recommendations that . . . 
improve the health care delivery system and health outcomes, including by 
promoting integrated care, care coordination, prevention and wellness, and quality 
and efficiency improvement.”78 
 Thus, the IPAB provisions provide a strong mechanism to defragment U.S. 
health care. Whenever Medicare spending is projected to exceed targets, which 
seems sadly inevitable, the IPAB must make proposals that include efforts to 
integrate care and improve care coordination if they would improve medical 
quality and efficiency.  Given the evidence noted above, this arguably creates an 
affirmative duty for IPAB to adopt regulations that allow firms to defragment 
healthcare because that would both lower costs and improve quality. 
 Specifically, under either the CMI or the IPAB, the federal government 
could and should promulgate several regulations that lift current legal obstacles to 
defragmentation.  Such regulations should preempt state laws that prevent firms 
from controlling physician behavior, such as the corporate practice of medicine 
doctrine and various tort doctrines.  Such regulations should also limit the scope of 
federal and state prohibitions on fee-splitting and thus allow more financial 
coordination between hospitals and physicians.79  Regulations could also change 
payment systems to freely allow integrated payments to any firm that orchestrates 
the providers necessary to achieve a valued health outcome.  Vigorous antitrust 
                                                 
77 Id. § 1395kkk(c)(1)(A). 
78 Id. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(B)(ii)(I). 
79 Federal regulators have already exercised their power to establish waivers of the federal 
rules banning referral and anti-referral fees to the extent that they conflict with the regulations 
authorizing ACOs.  See Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection With the Shared 
Savings Program, 76 Fed. Register. 67992 (Nov. 2, 2011).   
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enforcement would remain necessary to make sure that the permitted integration is 
efficient rather than anticompetitive, but those are the same rules of competitive 
markets that we apply to airlines and other industries.80  Given such antitrust 
enforcement, the effect of using Obamacare to deregulate health care 
fragmentation would be to create a market where competing firms could 
experiment with various forms of integration different from HMOs and would have 
incentives driving them towards the efficient level of integration for any set of 
health care activities. 
 Fully optimizing health care markets will require giving firms the right 
incentives by having those regulations change the payment system to pay firms for 
the value of the health outcomes they achieve, just as we pay airlines for the 
outcome of getting us to a destination.  Instead, we currently pay providers either 
for treatments (creating incentives to overcare) or for promises to provide all 
“necessary” treatments (creating incentives to undercare), neither of which turns on 
the outcomes achieved.  However, paying for the value of outcomes is difficult in 
                                                 
80 Some have expressed concern that health care integration might lead to market power or 
tying.  See Barak Richman, Concentration in Health Care Markets, AEI (June 2012).  These are 
legitimate concerns, but concerns that apply to integration in all industries.  To the extent 
integration combines horizontal competitors in a way that creates market power whose 
anticompetitive effects are not offset by efficiencies, it can be blocked under the usual antitrust 
law on mergers and joint ventures.  For example, although integration between a hospital and a 
single physician group is vertical, if such vertical integration combines multiple physician groups 
then that aspect is a horizontal merger that violates antitrust law if it increases physician market 
power without offsetting efficiencies.  Indeed, the antitrust agencies have already issued 
guidelines on ACOs that make clear they will be treated under the same sort of antitrust rule of 
reason analysis as other productive joint ventures.  See FTC/DOJ, Statement of Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026 (Oct. 28, 2011).  To the extent the concern is that 
integration might enable firms to engage in anticompetitive tying, the standard antitrust response 
in the United States is not to block the integration (which would lose any efficiencies associated 
with it) but to challenge the post-integration tying if it occurs and actually proves 
anticompetitive.  See ELHAUGE, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 680-81 (2d. ed. 2011).  
This approach seems sensible given the vigor of anti-tying law.  See Elhauge, Tying, Bundled 
Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 397 
(2009). 
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health care because it requires putting a financial value on health outcomes and 
determining the extent to which firms improved them.  I can readily ascertain 
whether an airline gets me to Oregon and how much I value that, but it can be hard 
to tell whether I ended up sick despite the best health care or ended up healthy for 
reasons unrelated to the care I received.  It may also be hard to tell how much to 
value avoiding health conditions I have not experienced. 
 To be sure, we are implicitly putting a financial value on health outcomes 
today by paying a certain amount for treatments that have some expected 
outcomes, and we could do a lot more to make payments track the extent to which 
firms actually advance those health outcomes.  One could imagine integrated 
payments for everyone involved in, say, successful hip replacements or treatments 
of congestive heart failure, with the amount of those payments reduced if there was 
an infection, readmission, or the hip or heart did not work.  More systematically, 
one might imagine paying each provider based on the quality-adjusted life years 
their treatments saved.  These sorts of approaches actually become more feasible 
the more integrated firms are because one can make more reliable statistical 
conclusions about a firm’s contribution to health outcomes when the sample size of 
those outcomes is larger. 
 An even bigger problem with pricing treatments by value is that to be 
efficient prices would have to reflect the value not to the average patient but to the 
marginal patient (i.e., the patient who now gets the least value from the medical 
product or service).  There is a great deal of medicine whose typical value far 
exceeds its cost, so if we paid by average value we would send costs skyrocketing.  
For example, consider the use of penicillin, which often saves lives.  A penicillin 
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prescription today costs around $28, and we value saving a life at $9 million.81  If 
we paid by average value, we might pay, say, $1 million per penicillin prescription.  
But that would make our health care costs explode and at that price suppliers 
would have incentives to supply even when the value was zero, which here would 
also worsen the problem of antibiotic overuse creating antibiotic resistant bacteria.  
We could try to restrain this supply effect by requiring the patients to pay the costs.  
But such pricing would lose the financial protection of insurance and prevent many 
beneficial uses of penicillin when value was less than $1 million but far in excess 
its costs.  Further, setting a price at $1 million would result in all usages being 
somewhere between $1 million and $9 million, creating a new average value that 
lies somewhere between, perhaps up to $2 million, which would then result in a 
new higher average, and so on until the prescriptions cost $9 million and penicillin 
was used only for live saving purposes.  Alternatively, we could use co-pays to 
restrain demand, but that just brings us back to the same question because if we set 
the co-pay equal to, say, 10% of the $1 million price, we will lose many beneficial 
uses valued below $100,000.  We would need to know the marginal value to set the 
right copay amount, and even then we would lose much of the access and financial 
protection that insurance is supposed to supply. 
 So we would want to set prices by marginal value, but marginal value is 
even harder to determine because the QALYs used to assess the benefits of health 
improvements are aggregate, as are the statistical techniques used to measure the 
contribution of drugs and services to such health improvements.  You cannot run a 
regression to determine the contribution of a treatment to the marginal patient who 
benefits least.  Perhaps in some cases, like penicillin, we could approximate 
                                                 
81 Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in U.S. Department of 
Transportation Analyses (2013), available at http://www.dot.gov/regulations/economic-values-
used-in-analysis.   
28 
 
marginal value as equal to cost, and thus set prices at cost.  (To reflect the full 
costs, we should add a tax equal to the externality created by contributing to the 
development of antibiotic resistant bacteria.)  But that will not work well for 
patented drugs, where we want prices to exceed costs in order to encourage drug 
innovation and testing.  Such a system would also be difficult to apply to provider 
labor, where costs are the opportunity costs of time.  More important, making 
prices equal costs would have the serious problem that (1) it would eliminate 
incentives to increase value and reduce costs, which was the main goal of allowing 
integration in the first place; and (2) it would do nothing to prevent the provision of 
care whose costs exceeds its value. 
 Given the difficulties with directly assessing the marginal value of health 
care, the best alternative may be to create a payment system that values outcomes 
implicitly via competition for patients without creating firm incentives to 
undercare or overcare.  One alternative approach would be to give each firm both: 
(1) an amount per patient or enrollee attracted, which they could keep as profits; 
and (2) a separate risk-adjusted payment that must be spent on care for the group of 
patients or enrollees, and thus cannot go to firm profits.82  Such a system would 
eliminate incentives to over-care (because increased care would not expand the 
fixed budget for care) or under-care (because profits could not be retained from 
unspent portions of this budget).  It would instead give firms incentives to 
efficiently spend its fixed budget for care to maximize health benefits in order to 
attract the most patients or enrollees in the future, which is what determines their 
profits.  To be sure, such a system might lead firms to spend on other things 
patients value, like private hospital rooms or more friendly customer service, but 
                                                 
82 See Elhauge, supra note 6, at 19–20.  To the extent this is done on a per patient basis, it 
would require separating treatments from diagnoses of the need for treatments, or else the system 
would create incentives to overdiagnose. 
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such comforts are also part of the merits that patients justifiably value when they 
deal with airlines or other firms that provide them with services, and a calmer 
homier atmosphere might have health benefits as well.  As with all markets, such 
choices will be imperfect to the extent consumer choices are imperfect, and one 
might worry consumers will make worse choices here than when choosing airlines.  
However, consumers are already making imperfect choices among health 
providers, only now within a bad incentive system that exacerbates the problem.  
Under this sort of system, as long as consumer choices bear some positive 
relationship to the ability of health firms to create value, the firm incentives will 
run in the right direction.  Such a system would thus give integrated firms the 
ability and much stronger incentives to optimize team production by the medical 
professionals within their control. 
 This proposed approach of separating profit payments from care payments 
has some similarity to the medical loss ratio requirements of Obamacare, which 
require that insurers spend 80-85% of their premiums on healthcare.83  But the 
proposal here differs in various key ways.  First, it would extend beyond insurers 
to integrated providers, thus providing a solution to the integration problem rather 
than merely an effort to reduce insurer profiteering.  Second, it would give a profit 
payment per enrollee that is not set as a percentage of spending and thus eliminates 
the incentive to spend more on care to get more.   Third, it would separate profits 
from spending, rather than try to micromanage the allocation of money between 
administration versus medical care, which may be counterproductive when better 
administration would lead to more efficient care.  Nonetheless, the proposal has 
enough of a family resemblance to the medical loss ratio rules that it would not 
require a great leap in regulatory strategy, which might smooth the transition to 
such a system. 
                                                 
83 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18. 
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V. Conclusion 
 The fragmentation of the U.S. health care increases costs and decreases 
quality.  The main reason such defragmentation persists is a combination of 
regulatory and payment laws that entrench physician autonomy and prevent the 
development of integrated firms that have the incentives and control necessary to 
achieve the team coordination needed in modern medicine.  In an era where the 
biggest question facing the country may be the long-term trend in health care 
costs,84 the Obamacare provisions that enable the federal government to remove 
legal barriers to efficient healthcare integration offer a critical and useful tool.  
Used effectively, regulations under these provisions could improve health care, 
potentially saving tens of thousands of lives, avoiding hundreds of thousands of 
injuries, and saving hundreds of billions of dollars in medical costs.  Given the 
persisting objections to the costs of Obamacare, adopting regulations like this that 
can save huge sums of money while improving quality may indeed be necessary to 
make Obamacare a success and fend off efforts to undermine it.  These regulatory 
tools also have the clear benefit of allowing progress to be made without requiring 
another round of politically volatile federal health care lawmaking. 
                                                 
84 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 7, tbl.1-2 (June 
2010, revised August 2010) (projecting federal health care spending to rise from 5.5% of gross 
domestic product in 2010 to 9.7% in 2035); Louise Radnofsky, Steep Rise in Health Costs 
Projected, The Wall Street Journal (June 12, 2012) (US healthcare spending projected to rise 
from 17.9% in 2010 to 19.6% in 2021). 
